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Introduction
Recent research has demonstrated the potential to create 
artiicial intelligence-based health-care applications that can 
reach or exceed the performance of clinicians for speciic 
tasks.1 hese applications could help to address major global 
challenges, including shortages of clinicians to meet the de-
mands of ageing populations and the inequalities in access to 
health care in low-resource countries. Health care, however, 
is a complex, safety-critical domain in which technological 
failures can lead directly to patient harm.2
he prospect of patient harm caused by the decisions 
made by an artiicial intelligence-based clinical tool is some-
thing to which current practices of moral accountability and 
safety assurance worldwide have not yet adjusted. In this paper 
we focus on two implications of clinical decision-making that 
involves artiicial intelligence: moral accountability for harm to 
patients; and safety assurance to protect patients against such 
harm. Our central thesis is that digital tools are challenging the 
standard clinical practices of assigning blame, as well of assur-
ing safety. We use an example from an artiicial intelligence-
based clinical system developed for use in the treatment of 
sepsis. We discuss this system’s perceived and actual beneits 
and harms, and consider the moral accountability and safety 
assurance issues that arise from the perspective of both clini-
cians and patients. We conclude with practical suggestions for 
dealing with moral accountability and safety assurance in the 
use of artiicial intelligence in health care.
Moral accountability
Moral responsibility concerns, among other things, account-
ability for one’s decisions and actions.3 We will use the terms 
moral responsibility and moral accountability interchangeably. 
It is important, however, to distinguish moral accountability 
from legal liability. hough closely related, the former can exist 
in the absence of the latter, and vice versa. We do not consider 
questions of law in this paper. 
In the past 50 years there has been a strong trend in phi-
losophy to think that making moral responsibility judgements, 
such as blaming and praising, is an inherently social practice.4 
hese judgements express reactions such as resentment or 
gratitude for how we have been treated by others and whether 
this treatment corresponds to our interpersonal expectations 
and demands.4 Many philosophers deine two conditions for 
a person to be morally responsible for an action: the control 
condition (control over the decision or action, where loss of 
control is not due to recklessness) and the epistemic condi-
tion (suicient understanding of the decision or action and 
its likely consequences, where ignorance is not due to negli-
gence).5,6 hese conditions can be traced back to the writings 
of the Greek philosopher Aristotle in the 4th century BCE.7 
Failure to meet these conditions would excuse a person from 
moral responsibility.
Numerous academic philosophers have written about 
what constitutes relevant control or suicient understanding 
in the context of moral responsibility.8 Nonetheless, when 
artiicial intelligence systems are involved in the decision-
making process, it is uncertain how far it would be reasonable 
to hold human clinicians accountable for patient harm. First, 
clinicians do not exercise direct control over what decisions 
or recommendations a system reaches. Second, many artiicial 
intelligence systems are inherently opaque,9 so a clinician’s un-
derstanding of precisely how the system translates input data 
into output decisions is diicult, if not impossible, to achieve.
Many artiicial intelligence systems in health care, includ-
ing the system that we describe in this paper, are assistive 
systems. In such cases, human clinicians make the inal deci-
sion about whether to act on the system’s recommendations. 
In respect of this inal decision or choice, human clinicians 
therefore meet the control and epistemic conditions men-
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tioned earlier. However, this final 
choice is only half of the picture: the 
clinician cannot directly change the 
system’s internal decision-making 
process once it is underway, and can-
not be sure that the software is reach-
ing conclusions that reflect his or her 
clinical intentions. The clinician also 
has epistemic uncertainty about how 
the recommendation was reached. 
Furthermore, the choice to implement 
the recommendations will be affected 
by wider structural and organizational 
factors, such as the clinician’s workload 
and the development of reliance on au-
tomation.10 Assigning the final decision 
to a clinician creates moral and safety 
dilemmas for them, as we discuss later 
in the article. Delegating a part of the 
decision-making process to artificial 
intelligence systems raises important 
questions about how far a clinician is 
accountable for patient harm.
Safety assurance
Safety assurance is concerned with 
demonstrating conidence in a system’s 
safety. Assurance of safety is commonly 
communicated through a safety case – a 
document written by the developers of 
the technology or service – which pro-
vides a reasoned argument supported 
by a body of evidence. he safety case 
explains why a system is acceptably safe 
to operate as intended in a deined envi-
ronment. As emphasized by the Health 
Foundation,11
“the act of establishing and docu-
menting a safety case helps expose 
existing implicit assumptions and 
risk acceptance judgements. Having 
documented a case, it becomes easier 
to review the arguments, question the 
evidence and challenge the adequacy 
of the approach presented. his 
creates greater transparency in the 
overall process.”
As such, the safety case helps by making 
an explicit statement of implicit under-
standing. Transparency in the design 
of artiicial intelligence technologies, 
especially when the functionality is 
safety-critical, makes a safety case es-
sential for health-care applications.12
To date, the combination of high 
risk of harm and strict regulation has 
limited the scope and authority of digital 
health interventions. here has therefore 
been only limited transfer of clinical de-
cision-making from clinicians to digital 
systems. Critical sotware functions have 
been tightly deined so that the sotware 
exhibits predictable behaviour, for ex-
ample in controlling infusion pumps or 
pacemakers or in robot-assisted surgery 
where the tools are under the direct 
control of clinical professionals. hese 
limitations have been necessary to en-
sure that qualiied clinicians are able to 
interpret dynamically complex variables 
related to patients and the clinical and 
social context. Artiicial intelligence 
systems have shown the potential to im-
prove clinicians’ interpretation and the 
subsequent decision-making process.13 
he potential beneits of this capability, 
however, are ofset by the widening of 
responsibility gaps and the additional 
risk of negative side-efects that are 
inherent in health-care interventions.14 
In essence, the increasing of the scope 
and authority of digital health systems 
is challenging existing safety assurance 
practices and clinical accountability 
models.15 hese safety assurance and 
moral accountability challenges explain 
some of the reluctance of safety-critical 
industries, such as aviation and nuclear 
power to consider applications of arti-
icial intelligence.
Example system
he example artiicial intelligence 
system we consider here concerns the 
treatment of sepsis. Sepsis is “a life-
threatening organ dysfunction caused 
by a dysregulated host response to 
infection”16 and has become a global 
health challenge, overtaking myocar-
dial infarction and stroke as a cause 
of hospital admission, even in wealthy 
countries.17 Sepsis may progress to septic 
shock, where intravenous luids alone 
are insuicient to maintain blood pres-
sure and vasopressor medications are 
required. Patients with septic shock have 
a hospital mortality of over 40%, and are 
usually looked ater in a critical care or 
intensive care unit.16 Historically, the 
standard treatment in critical care has 
been to establish a target mean arterial 
blood pressure (traditionally greater 
than 65 mmHg), administer luids 
intravenously until no further improve-
ment is seen (but usually a minimum 
of 30 mL/kg), and to start vasopressor 
medications if shock has not resolved 
thereater.18 However, it is gradually 
becoming clear that a single target for 
blood pressure in sepsis is not appro-
priate, and the balance of luids versus 
vasopressors to achieve it is still subject 
to debate.19
To help address the challenge of 
optimizing treatment, researchers at 
Imperial College London have devel-
oped the Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
Clinician,20 a proof-of-concept system 
that uses reinforcement learning to rec-
ommend actions for the care of patients 
fulfilling the third international con-
sensus definitions for sepsis and septic 
shock.16 As these patients have a 90-day 
mortality in the region of 20%, the 
system’s software is trained on avoiding 
deaths. The system analyses 48 features 
from an electronic patient record and 
uses a Markov decision process to 
simulate clinical decision-making, rec-
ommending doses of fluids and vaso-
pressors in broad bands for each 4-hour 
window. Thus far, the system has been 
developed using retrospective data 
and is still being evaluated off-policy 
(without following its advice), but the 
developers envisage prospective trials 
in the future. In the next two sections, 
we illustrate key moral accountability 
and safety assurance gaps introduced by 
this type of artificial intelligence-based 
capability.
Potential benefits and 
harms
AI Clinician ofers recommendations 
for personalized treatment based em-
pirically on the outcomes of thousands 
of patients, without simply choosing an 
arbitrary target blood pressure, in fact, 
operating without any speciic target 
at all. It has been shown that human 
clinicians can be distracted by compet-
ing pressures at work and are subject 
to clinical inertia (keeping a treatment 
unchanged despite changes in the pa-
tient’s clinical picture).21 By contrast, the 
digital system is ever-vigilant, providing 
individualized recommendations every 
4 hours. It is important to note, however, 
that it is not clear that a physician’s in-
ertia is always harmful in health care. 
he Markov decision process is a math-
ematical model of outcomes which are 
partly random and partly determined 
by decisions made by the system along 
the way. AI Clinician therefore ignores 
previous states of the system when mak-
ing a decision and could potentially go 
against usual clinical practice by recom-
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mending sudden changes in the doses of 
vasopressor drugs.
AI Clinician is an assistive tech-
nology and so the whole clinical task 
is not delegated to the system. he 
inal decision is made by the human 
clinician in charge of the patient’s care. 
Yet an important, cognitive part of 
the decision-making task is delegated: 
the interpretation of data. In transfer-
ring even part of the decision-making 
process to a machine, the control and 
epistemic conditions of responsibility 
are weakened.
he control condition is further 
compromised as follows. he complexity 
of the clinical setting is determined by 
the sepsis itself, the presence of factors 
such as new treatments, new diagno-
ses, new bacteria and viruses, as well 
as diferences in patient care at earlier 
time points. It is diicult, however, to 
represent the clinical setting in the 
computational model during the design 
phase of the technology. hus, the sot-
ware’s behaviour may not fully relect 
the clinical intentions on the system, 
since it was not feasible to specify them 
completely. his issue is currently dealt 
with by ignoring aspects of the process 
(for example, by limiting the number of 
inputs of information compared with 
those received by human clinicians). But 
there may be unintended consequences. 
For example, insensible losses of luid 
cannot be electronically recorded, which 
could lead to the machine suggesting 
more luids are needed when a clini-
cian can see that the patient is already 
waterlogged. Furthermore, the machine 
may interpret the data in a way that does 
not relect the human clinician’s reason-
ing as to what is most important in the 
context. For example, a clinician might 
choose to ignore a highly anomalous 
blood test result that could have been 
due to an error in blood sampling, test 
processing or result transcription. 
With respect to the epistemic 
condition, it is diicult to understand 
what constitutes best practice in the 
treatment of sepsis in hospitals, for 
several reasons. First, there are a variety 
of approaches used by clinicians to treat 
sepsis. Second, there can be diferences 
in practice between clinicians (who set 
a general overview of the care plan) and 
nurses (who are responsible for minute-
by-minute changes in care). hird, is 
the fact that best practice changes, both 
in terms of an evolving understanding 
of optimal treatment (for example, the 
move away from giving luids towards 
use of vasopressor drugs) and in terms 
of new diseases and treatments that 
prompt questions about the meaning of 
optimal care. he epistemic condition is 
further compromised by two features of 
the machine itself: its own partial inter-
pretation of the operating environment; 
and the opacity of many of its decisions 
even to the designers and users.
Clinician and patient 
perspectives
An integral part of any complex health-
care system is the implicit promise that 
clinicians and health-care organizations 
make to patients: to exercise good judge-
ment, act with competence and provide 
healing.22 Moral accountability helps to 
avoid professional complacency and 
it underpins the patient’s trust in the 
clinician providing care. Patients tend 
to believe that the clinician is acting 
towards them with goodwill. However, 
goodwill is irrelevant, to the decisions 
reached by a sotware program. If 
human clinicians do not have robust 
control and knowledge of an artiicial 
intelligence system’s recommendations, 
then it would be reasonable for a patient 
to want to know why those recommen-
dations were followed.
We can describe the artiicial intel-
ligence system as only advisory and 
expect that accountability is thereby 
secure, because human clinicians still 
make the inal decision. However, this 
action potentially results in a dilemma 
with two equally undesirable choices. 
Either clinicians must spend the time 
to develop their own opinions as to the 
best course of action, meaning that the 
artiicial intelligence system adds little 
value; or clinicians must accept the 
advice blindly, further weakening both 
the control and epistemic conditions of 
moral accountability. he same dilemma 
afects safety assurance, as it becomes 
impossible to assure the system in isola-
tion, because the system being assured 
now includes the clinician.
In the absence of a clinician’s direct, 
deliberate control over the recommen-
dations reached by an artiicial intel-
ligence system, and given the opacity of 
many of these systems, safety assurance 
becomes increasingly important to both 
clinicians and patients. Safety assurance 
provides grounds for conidence that 
the patient safety risk associated with 
the system remains as low as reason-
ably possible. However, the static nature 
of most current safety cases does not 
cope with the dynamic characteristics 
of either clinical settings or machine 
learning. he adaptive behaviour of 
artiicial intelligence systems typically 
alters the clinical environment, thereby 
invalidating the assumptions made 
in the safety case.15 In addition, the 
intended function of an artiicial intel-
ligence system is extremely diverse, and 
only partially understood by everyone 
involved, particularly the developers and 
the clinicians. he intended function 
cannot therefore be fully represented 
in the concrete speciication that is 
used to build the system and which the 
system implements. he speciication 
(in our example, sepsis treatment in 
intensive care) is based on a limited set 
of data points (vital signs and laboratory 
results). It is therefore much harder to 
assure, through a static safety case, that 
the system’s speciied function preserves 
safety in all clinical scenarios in which 
it will operate. It becomes increasingly 
hard to assess the actual risk of harm 
to patients and this diiculty presents 
an epistemic challenge to the safety 
engineer. he diiculty of mitigating the 
actual risk of harm to patients presents a 
control challenge to the safety engineer.
From a technical engineering per-
spective, consideration of the safety of 
artiicial intelligence is oten limited to 
robustness: the properties of the system 
that might reduce its performance and 
availability, but not necessarily lead to 
patient harm.23 An example is model 
overitting, where the predictive model 
fails to generalize beyond the set of data 
from which the model was derived. 
Technologists oten fail to trace the 
impact of these technical properties on 
patient harm; for example, how biases 
in the artiicial intelligence training data 
could compromise the safety of diagno-
sis in certain minority communities.
The way forward
Determining where moral account-
ability lies in complex socio-technical 
systems is a diicult and imprecise task. 
One of the important current debates in 
patient safety is how to balance account-
ability across individual clinicians and 
the organizations in which they work.24,25 
We argue for a need to include artiicial 
intelligence developers and systems 
safety engineers in our assessments of 
moral accountability for patient harm. 
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Meanwhile, none of the actors in the 
model robustly fulil the traditional 
conditions of moral accountability for 
the decisions of an artiicial intelligence 
system. We should therefore update 
our conception of moral responsibility 
in this context. We also believe in the 
need to move from a static to a dynamic 
model of assurance, accepting that con-
siderations of safety are not fully resolv-
able during the design of the artiicial 
intelligence system before the system 
has been deployed.26 his shit should 
include some consensus as to how much 
weakening of control, and what level of 
epistemic uncertainty is acceptably safe 
and morally justiiable before a digital 
system has been deployed, and in what 
context.
Moral accountability and safety 
assurance are continuing issues for 
complex artiicial intelligence systems 
in critical health-care contexts. As such, 
it will be important to proactively col-
lect data from, and experiences of, the 
use of such systems. We need to update 
safety risks based on actual clinical 
practice, by quantifying the morally 
relevant efects of reliance on artiicial 
intelligence systems and determining 
how clinical practice has been inlu-
enced by the machine system itself. To 
do this we need an understanding of 
how clinicians, patients and the artiicial 
intelligence systems themselves adapt 
their behaviour throughout the course 
of their interactions. ■
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ᅋေ
၄ਏЌࡲᇏ֥ದ۽ᇆିğ໙ᄳᇅބνಆྟ
ࠎႿದ۽ᇆି֥ਢԵ۽ऎ෮ቓ֥थקॖି߶ؓߑᆀᄯ
Ӯഄݝđطଢభൗࢸٓຶଽ֥໙ᄳބνಆൌ࡬ഉໃؓ
Վቔԛטᆜb໡ૌᇗܱׄᇿದ۽ᇆିᇅקਢԵथҦ֥
ਆ۱ٚ૫໙ี ğؓ ߑᆀᄯӮഄݝ֥֣֡໙ᄳĠၛࠣν
ಆಒЌЌ޹ߑᆀ૧൳ՎোഄݝbࠎႿದ۽ᇆି֥۽ऎ
ᆞᄝ็ᅞሔ࣮ᄳ಩ބಒЌνಆ֥ѓሙਢԵൌ࡬bਢԵ
၄ളބνಆ۽ӱഽؓದ۽ᇆି༢๤ቓԛ֥थҦ֥॥ᇅ
৯ࢠ೐đᄝದ۽ᇆି༢๤ೂޅሙಒֹቓԛथҦٚ૫֥
ᆩ്ބ৘ࢳඣ௜္ࢠ֮b໡ૌ๙ݖ၂۱ႨႿᇍਏϧ࿓
ᆡ֥ದ۽ᇆି༢๤ቔູൕ২đটӂඍᆃ၂ٳ༅b໓ᅣ
ቋުؓೂޅߏࢳᆃུքႬิԛਔ్ൌॖྛ֥ࡹၰb໡
ૌಪູ൅ٳႵсေಞದ۽ᇆିषؿದჴބ༢๤νಆ۽
ӱഽҕა໡ૌؓߑᆀഄݝ֥֣֡໙ᄳ௟ܙᇏb๝ൈđ
ଆ྘ᇏીႵ಩ޅҕაᆀॖၛޓݺֹડቀದ۽ᇆି༢๤
थҦᇏ֣֡໙ᄳ֥Ԯ๤่ࡱbၹՎđ໡ૌႋھᄝᆃٚ
૫۷ྍ໡ૌ֥֣֡໙ᄳܴ୑b໡ૌߎླေՖ࣡෿֥Ќ
ᅰଆൔሇэູ׮෿֥Ќᅰଆൔđ࣐ܵ҆ඇದ۽ᇆି༢
๤ᆭభđದ۽ᇆି༢๤ഡ࠹ݖӱᇏνಆٚ૫֥ܤ੮ഉ
ໃປಆࢳथb
Résumé
L'intelligence artificielle en soins de santé : responsabilité et sécurité
La perspective que les décisions prises par un outil clinique basé sur 
l'intelligence artificielle puissent porter préjudice aux patients est un 
concept dont les bonnes pratiques de responsabilité et de sécurité 
actuelles ne tiennent pas encore compte à travers le monde. Nous 
nous concentrons sur deux aspects qui caractérisent les décisions de 
l'intelligence artificielle à usage clinique : la responsabilité morale des 
préjudices aux patients, et la garantie de sécurité pour protéger les 
patients contre de tels préjudices. Les outils fondés sur l'intelligence 
artificielle remettent en cause les pratiques cliniques conventionnelles 
d'attribution des responsabilités et de garantie de la sécurité. Les 
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décisions formulées par les systèmes d'intelligence artificielle sont de 
moins en moins soumises au contrôle des médecins et spécialistes 
de la sécurité, qui ne comprennent et ne maîtrisent pas toujours les 
subtilités régissant cette prise de décision. Nous illustrons notre analyse 
en l'appliquant à un exemple de système d'intelligence artificielle 
développé dans le cadre du traitement des infections. Le présent 
document se termine par une série de suggestions concrètes servant 
à identifier de nouveaux moyens de tempérer ces inquiétudes. Nous 
estimons qu'il est nécessaire d'inclure les développeurs à l'origine 
de l'intelligence artificielle ainsi que les spécialistes de la sécurité 
des systèmes dans notre évaluation de la responsabilité morale des 
préjudices causés aux patients. Car pour l'instant, aucun des acteurs 
impliqués dans le modèle ne remplit pleinement les conditions 
traditionnelles de responsabilité morale pour les décisions prises par 
un dispositif d'intelligence artificielle. Dans ce contexte, il est donc 
essentiel revoir notre conception de la responsabilité morale. Nous 
devons également passer d'un modèle de garantie statique à un modèle 
de garantie dynamique, et accepter que certains impératifs de sécurité 
ne puissent être entièrement résolus durant l'élaboration du système 
d'intelligence artificielle, avant sa mise en œuvre.
Резюме
Искусственный интеллект в сфере здравоохранения: прозрачность и безопасность
Вероятность причинения вреда пациентам в результате 
принятия решений с помощью клинических инструментов, 
основанных на использовании искусственного интеллекта, 
пока что не учитывается в нынешних мировых практиках 
обеспечения прозрачности и безопасности. Авторы уделяют 
особое внимание двум аспектам применения искусственного 
интеллекта в клинической практике для принятия решений: 
моральной ответственности за вред, причиненный пациентам, и 
обеспечению безопасности для защиты пациентов от такого вреда. 
Инструменты, основанные на использовании искусственного 
интеллекта, бросают вызов стандартной клинической практике 
распределения ответственности и обеспечения безопасности. 
Лечащие врачи и инженеры по технике безопасности имеют 
небольшое влияние на решения, принимаемые с использованием 
систем искусственного интеллекта, и не обладают полными 
знаниями и пониманием тонкостей процесса принятия решений 
системами искусственного интеллекта. С целью наглядной 
демонстрации такого анализа авторы приводят пример 
системы на основе искусственного интеллекта, разработанной 
для использования при лечении сепсиса. В конце документа 
приводятся практические предложения по решению этих 
проблем. Авторы настаивают на необходимости включения 
разработчиков искусственного интеллекта и инженеров систем 
безопасности в процесс оценки моральной ответственности за 
вред, причиненный пациенту. Между тем ни один из участников 
модели полностью не удовлетворяет традиционным условиям, 
предъявляемым к моральной ответственности за решения, 
принимаемые системой искусственного интеллекта. В связи с этим 
необходимо пересмотреть понятие моральной ответственности 
в данном контексте. Требуется также перейти от статической 
к динамической модели обеспечения гарантий, признав, что 
невозможно полностью учесть соображения безопасности 
при разработке системы искусственного интеллекта до ее 
развертывания.
Resumen
La inteligencia artificial en la atención sanitaria: responsabilidad y seguridad
La perspectiva de que los pacientes sufran daños a causa de por las 
decisiones tomadas por un instrumento clínico de inteligencia artificial 
es un aspecto al que todavía no se han ajustado las prácticas actuales de 
responsabilidad y seguridad en todo el mundo. El presente documento 
se centra en dos aspectos de la inteligencia artificial clínica utilizada para 
la toma de decisiones: la responsabilidad moral por el daño causado a los 
pacientes y la garantía de seguridad para proteger a los pacientes contra 
dicho daño. Las herramientas de inteligencia artificial están desafiando 
las prácticas clínicas estándar de asignación de responsabilidades y de 
garantía de seguridad. Los médicos clínicos y los ingenieros de seguridad 
de las personas tienen menos control sobre las decisiones que adoptan 
por los sistemas de inteligencia artificial y menos conocimiento y 
comprensión de la forma precisa en que los sistemas de inteligencia 
artificial adoptan sus decisiones. Este análisis se ilustra aplicándolo a un 
ejemplo de un sistema de inteligencia artificial desarrollado para su uso 
en el tratamiento de la sepsis. El documento termina con sugerencias 
prácticas sobre las vías de acción para mitigar estas preocupaciones. 
Se sostiene la necesidad de incluir a los desarrolladores de inteligencia 
artificial y a los ingenieros de seguridad de sistemas en las evaluaciones 
de la responsabilidad moral por los daños causados a los pacientes. 
Entretanto, ninguno de los actores del modelo cumple sólidamente las 
condiciones tradicionales de responsabilidad moral por las decisiones 
de un sistema de inteligencia artificial. En consecuencia, se debería 
actualizar nuestra concepción de la responsabilidad moral en este 
contexto. También es preciso pasar de un modelo de garantía estático 
a uno dinámico, aceptando que las consideraciones de seguridad 
no se pueden resolver plenamente durante el diseño del sistema de 
inteligencia artificial antes de que el sistema sea implementado.
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